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Abstract This paper re-evaluates what constitutes a
social robot by analysing how a range of different forms
of robot are interpreted as socially aware and com-
municative. Its argument juxtaposes a critical assess-
ment of the development of humanlike and animal-like
robotic companions with a consideration of human re-
lations with machinelike robots in working teams. The
paper employs a range of communication theories along-
side ideas relating to anthropomorphism and zoomor-
phism in discussing human-robot interactions. Some tra-
ditions of communication theory offer perspectives that
support the development of humanlike and animal-like
social robots. However, these perspectives have been
critiqued within communications scholarship as uneth-
ically closed to the possibilities of otherness and dif-
ference. This paper therefore reconfigures and extends
the use of communication theory to explore how ma-
chinelike robots are interpreted by humans as social
and communicative others. This involves an analysis
of human relations with Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(EOD) robots and with the robotic desk lamp, AUR.
The paper positions social robotics research as impor-
tant in understanding working teams containing hu-
mans and robots. In particular, this paper introduces
the value of tempered anthropomorphism and zoomor-
phism as processes that support communication be-
tween humans and machinelike robots, while also en-
suring that a sense of the otherness of the machine and
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1 Introduction
Although the field of social robotics is strongly linked
with the placement of robots in human social spaces,
social robots are sometimes thought of more generally
as machines that are able to interact with one another
and/or with humans in social ways [22]. When inter-
acting with others of their own kind they may form
swarm-like systems, reminiscent of organised colonies
of insects such as ants or bees. Alternatively, they may
interact in groups whose structure is based on an aware-
ness of each group member as an individual, alongside
a respect for particular rules and behaviours that sup-
port the success of the group as a whole. These types of
group operate more like mammalian social groups than
insect colonies [22][15]. Social robots that are designed
to interact with one another in either of these ways
take a number of forms, including machinelike (a term
used in this paper to denote robots that are neither hu-
manlike nor animal-like), animal-like and humanlike, as
illustrated by the types of robots that have competed,
and are currently competing, in the various categories
of Robcup Soccer competition.
However, although “the media equation” theory of
Byron Reeves and Clifford Nass supports the idea that
humans will automatically relate to any form of robot in
“fundamentally social and natural” ways, social robots,
designed specifically to interact with people in human
social spaces, as detailed below, are most often cre-
ated in humanlike or animal-like form [44]. In addition,
the research of Bartneck et al, which draws on Stanley




participated in a process apparently involving the need
to administer electric shocks to other humans, demon-
strates that people’s treatment of robots in such a sit-
uation does differ from their treatment of humans [4].
In particular, all people taking part were convinced to
administer the highest electric shock on the scale to the
robot, whereas in the original experiment some people
did refuse to continue to this point [4]. The critical anal-
ysis of human-robot interactions presented in this paper
therefore sets aside media equation theory to consider
human communication theories, and ideas of anthropo-
morphism and zoomorphism, in assessing the reasons
behind the focus on creating humanlike and animal-like
robots in support of relations with humans. The paper
then moves on to support the benefits of considering
machinelike robots as social actors, by re-configuring
and extending communication theory and introducing
the importance of employing anthropomorphism and
zoomorphism in a ‘tempered’ form. This type of tem-
pered response supports people’s interactions with ma-
chinelike robots, while encouraging them to retain a
clear sense of the non-human abilities that such a robot
can bring to a human-robot team.
The paper briefly discusses the fictional origins of
robots, since these narratives identify some initial rea-
sons for pursuing humanlike robot design, before mov-
ing on to consider real-life robots in more depth. The
decision to create humanlike or animal-like robots to
interact socially with humans is driven in part by the
idea that something resembling a human or animal will
be easy to accept quickly as a potential companion. In
addition, as far as is possible, such robots are given
communicative abilities that are familiar, easy for peo-
ple to comprehend and to which they can respond with-
out difficulty. This paper therefore argues that, in gen-
eral, humanlike and animal-like social robot designs are
based on the assumption that familiar appearance and
modes of communication—whether using speech, hu-
manlike facial expressions or the production of easily
recognised and accepted animal-like reactions to human
actions—are the best way to support easy and effective
human-robot interactions. In particular, humanlike and
animal-like social robots illustrate the idea that suc-
cessful communication is not only based on what com-
municators have in common, but also seeks to increase
the sense of commonality between them as interactions
progress. From this perspective, social robots need to
be able to communicate information as precisely as pos-
sible whether verbally or nonverbally, should be persua-
sive communicators and should be positioned within a
familiar social and cultural context that is appropriate
to the humans they meet. This paper therefore identi-
fies how the assumptions of roboticists creating social
robots are shaped by concerns relating to form and con-
tent: the shape of the robot and its ability to commu-
nicate information and express itself clearly are both
regarded as important.
However, a critique of these assumptions about form
and behaviour, and the understandings of communica-
tion upon which they depend, supports the potential
of human interactions with machinelike robots. There-
fore, moving beyond the overtly social goal of creating
companions for people, this paper appraises the impor-
tance of personality and social positioning in situations
where humans and machinelike robots work together
in teams. An analysis of human responses to Pack-
Bots and Talons, robots deployed with EOD teams,
illustrates how these robots are treated as social sub-
jects, although their machinelike form and communica-
tive abilities might be expected to introduce some dif-
ficulties. In spite of this, specific robots become highly
regarded as valued team members, such that if they are
damaged their repair is placed as a priority over their
replacement. This occurs even though these robots are
currently almost always human-controlled, as opposed
to being autonomous in their operation. In the future,
EOD robots are likely to support more and more au-
tonomous capabilities. The autonomy of such robots
may well increase the complexity of their interactions
with humans by giving rise to situations where opera-
tors will need to trust these robots sufficiently to relin-
quish control to them. A further example, the robotic
desk lamp, AUR, is therefore employed to consider the
ramifications of this more fully. Although AUR is posi-
tioned in a laboratory, as opposed to the more danger-
ous environment occupied by EOD robots, a consider-
ation of its autonomous collaboration with human par-
ticipants to complete a joint task has implications for
humans working with more autonomous EOD robots in
the future.
The conclusion of this paper suggests that develop-
ing a social understanding of a robot with which one
is required to work strengthens the human-robot team,
enabling an effective use of both human and robot abil-
ities to complete tasks in cooperative ways. This social
understanding is likely to become increasingly impor-
tant as the robot becomes more autonomous, since peo-
ple working with such a robot must feel able to trust it
to do its job, even when it is left unattended or moves
out of sight or radio contact. Indeed, as robots are de-
veloped that are able to sense their surroundings and
learn tasks for themselves with more accuracy, people
working with them may need to allow their judgment
to be re-calibrated by the robot’s understanding of the
environment and the task at hand, such that the team
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can operate at the peak of its potential and complete
its job successfully.
2 Social robots and familiarity in fiction and in
real life
Arguments for developing humanlike robots were first
articulated in early science fiction, establishing a long
tradition connecting ideas about robots with human-
like form. Karel Capek’s play R. U. R. (Rossum’s Uni-
versal Robots) in 1920, and Fritz Lang and Thea von
Harbou’s film Metropolis in 1927, both describe the
creation of humanlike replacements for people at work
[8][32]. Indeed, Capek’s play contains the first use of the
term “robot” to describe its “artificial people”. These
narratives link the creation of robots similar to hu-
mans in shape and size, able to communicate and be
communicated with in familiar human ways, with the
easy replacement of human workers in human-tailored
working environments. In fiction that followed, notably
that of Isaac Asimov, the creation of the perfect hu-
manlike robot worker was also justified in more so-
cial terms through narratives such as The Bicenten-
nial Man, which describes a robot that, amongst other
changes, becomes increasingly able to express emotions
[3]. In the non-fiction essay, “The Friends We Make”,
Asimov suggested that “if we are to take on thinking
partners—or, at the least, thinking servants—in the
form of machines, we will be more comfortable with
them, and we will relate to them more easily, if they
are shaped like humans” [3]. He extended this appraisal
even further into the realm of the social when he ar-
gued that it would also “be easier to be friends with
human-shaped robots than with specialized machines
of unrecognizable shape” [3]. Asimov’s writing therefore
reinforced the idea that humanlike form and behvaiour
was linked with the successful creation of a social robot,
cementing this conception of the robot in the popular
cultural imagination.
Similar assumptions to those considered within sci-
ence fiction, regarding both form and communication in
support of social human-robot interactions, are found in
real-life. Although it has now been re-written, the Han-
son Robotics’ website expressed the desire “to model
the behavior and movements of people in robots that
act and react virtually indistinguishably from their hu-
man counterparts” [28]. The ultimate goal was to design
robots able to evolve “into socially intelligent beings,
capable of love and earning a place in the extended
human family” [28]. In a more recent, and measured,
statement, the RoboKind website (another company
founded by David Hanson) describes the desire to “de-
sign and build a new series of social robots that allow
people to interact with robots in a more natural man-
ner and on a more personal level than ever before” [45].
Hanson, and other roboticists such as Hiroshi Ishiguro,
concentrate on producing realistic humanlike robots,
with the aim of making them as indistinguishable as
possible from a human communicator. While Ishiguro
is famous for creating his own double, Hanson has cre-
ated robotic heads resembling Phillip K. Dick and Al-
bert Einstein, as well as new individuals such as Jules.
The idea that social robots should be able to commu-
nicate in a “natural manner”, where this really means
a natural human or humanlike manner, is also articu-
lated by Cynthia Breazeal and Anne Foerst who argue
that the best way to support human-robot interactions
is through the creation of robots that can “participate
in natural, human-style social exchange” [6]. Breazeal,
for example, describes “a sociable robot” as “socially
intelligent in a humanlike way”, such that “interact-
ing with it is like interacting with another person” [7].
In pursuing the creation of such a robot, Breazeal de-
signed Kismet at Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT). As probably the first robot specifically created
to be social or sociable, Kismet was designed to repro-
duce human facial expressions to indicate the six emo-
tions identified by some researchers as basic to all hu-
mans: happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust and sur-
prise [7][19][47]. Unlike Hanson’s robots, Kismet was
not meant to look exactly like a human, but rather
was created as a caricature, a design decision also seen
in robots developed more recently, such as Domo and
Mertz also at MIT.
Although very different, the creation of animal-like
social robots is also based around a sense of provid-
ing something familiar, non-threatening and easy with
which to interact. Robot animals, such as PARO, have
been shown to provide comfort and companionship for
people in the same way that a pet animal might, and
can be supported in environments or situations where
live animals cannot safely be introduced [33]. People’s
interactions with such animal-like robots are not overly
complex, and are likely to be shaped by their prior ex-
perience with owning pets or other experiences with
animals [33]. Roboticists therefore overtly shape these
robots’ communicative abilities to mirror those of ani-
mals, using sounds and body movements to indicate ex-
pected responses to human behaviours such as stroking
the robot’s fur. Again, it is the familiarity of these
robots’ form and the content expressed through their
behaviour which is understood to support their posi-
tioning as social companions to people.
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3 Anthropomorphism, “pairing” and
“harmonious behavior”
One way to theorise human interactions with human-
like robots is to consider the ways in which their form
and behaviour are designed to support a process of
anthropomorphism, through which human characteris-
tics are conferred upon the robot. Scientific discourse
is generally biased against anthropomorphism, arguing
that any attribution of human characteristics to non-
humans is incompatible with maintaining one’s objec-
tivity [29][21]. Indeed, Marc Bekoff has gone so far as to
describe anthropomorphism as one of the “‘dirty words’
in science” being linked with “the subjective and the
personal” [5]. However, social robotics research has, for
some time, been open to the idea of encouraging anthro-
pomorphic responses in humans. In particular, Turkle
et al, and Kirsten Dautenhahn’s early work, argued that
anthropomorphism is an important part of facilitating
meaningful human-robot interactions [53][16]. For ex-
ample, both the form and behaviour of the robot was
understood to support people’s anthropomorphic re-
sponse during interactions with Kismet [53]. It seems
likely that similar effects might occur when people meet
the types of robots designed by Hanson and Ishiguro.
Instead of creating robots that “merely take advantage
of the anthropomorphizing tendency in humans”, it can
therefore be argued that the designers of humanlike
robots overcome the potentially unsound nature of an-
thropomorphism by positioning it as a completely rea-
sonable way to understand their machines [16]. A sim-
ilar argument can be made for the creation of animal-
like robots, where these are designed to mimic their
living counterparts. Here it is the idea that the robot
can support a zoomorphic response that is key, with a
similar justification being possible for this as being a
completely reasonable way to respond to a robot such
as PARO, for example.
More recently, Dautenhahn has noted that anthro-
pomorphic responses to very humanlike robots tend to
raise human expectations too high in comparison with
the actual ability of the robot, suggesting that social
robotics researchers may wish to focus on developing
robots which use a few simplified humanlike features,
as well as non-humanoid robots [14]. This reappraisal is
also based on questioning whether robots can be under-
stood to behave or communicate “naturally”. Dauten-
hahn notes that “any behaviour of a robot will be nat-
ural or artificial, solely depending on how the humans
interacting with the robot perceive it” [14]. However, as
well as suggesting that “the goal of human-like robots
needs to be reflected upon critically”, Dautenhahn also
notes the continuing prevalence of the assumption “that
the the ultimate goal for designers of robots for human-
inhabited environments is to develop humanoid robots,
i.e. robots with a human-like shape” [14].
Analysing anthropomorphism from a phenomeno-
logical perspective offers a way to understand what
drives this process, and also identifies some potential
difficulties beyond that of setting aside an objective sci-
entific stance. Phenomenology, as originally formulated
by Edmund Husserl, and extended more recently by
philosophers such as Emmanuel Levinas, is concerned
with first-person perceptions of ‘phenomena’, the mean-
ings that are developed on the basis of these experi-
ences, and the individual explanations about the world
that result. A phenomenological perspective on human-
robot interactions offers a theoretical basis from which
to reconsider the value of anthropomorphic responses
to robots. Husserl for example suggests that the resem-
blance of one body to another can be understood to
support a process of what he terms “pairing” [31]. It is
through pairing that a person “understands something
new and unfamiliar, by analogy with something already
known and familiar” [11]. In addition, the continuous
demonstration of “harmonious behavior”, as seen in a
robot that effectively mimics human expressions, fur-
ther supports a person’s ability to understand that ma-
chine [11]. Clearly the linked concepts of ‘pairing’ and
‘harmonious behavior’ are useful to contextualise the
way in which anthropomorphism, while it is a subjec-
tive response, is understood to work in support of “nat-
ural” and therefore meaningful human interactions with
humanlike robots [6][7][45].
However, there are a number of problems with these
concepts. In particular, there is the question of how
close the resemblance, in form and behaviour, must be
in order to support understanding between communi-
cators. Briankle Chang asks, for example, whether it is
possible for a “healthy white middle-aged bachelor” to
recognise a “deformed pregnant black teenager” [11].
In terms of human-robot interactions, this raises the
question of exactly what, or who, humanlike robots are
designed to resemble and how this might alter commu-
nication with them. If one builds a white Caucasian
male robot will this limit the range of situations within
which such a robot can communicate successfully, or is
any form of humanness sufficient? Husserl himself offers
no means of defining the “minimal level of similarity be-
tween the two bodies being paired”, and was aware of
the difficulty this introduced for people wishing to the-
orise intersubjective relations using this concept [11].
In robotics itself, the question of how helpful it is to
strive for a close resemblance between human and robot
has also been raised, since encounters with very hu-
manlike robots invoke reactions of discomfort for some
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people. This type of reaction is most often described in
terms of the “uncanny valley” introduced by Masahiro
Mori in 1970 [40]. With this theory Mori predicts that
as the humanlike appearance of a robot increases, so
does its familiarity, but there is a point at which the
robot is suddenly perceived as zombielike and there-
fore very unattractive. Mori’s terminology can be linked
with Sigmund Freud’s conception of the “uncanny” as
“that class of the terrifying which leads back to some-
thing long known to us, once very familiar” [23]. The
theory is often illustrated with a graph, showing the
rise in familiarity, followed by a sudden drop, into the
“uncanny valley” when the robot’s humanlike nature
becomes unsettling as opposed to attractive [40]. Al-
though the graph does rise again, following its valley
section, thus far it is in fictional contexts that robots
have most clearly overcome people’s uncanny reaction,
as seen in the example of Data, the android officer from
Star Trek: The Next Generation.
The focus on creating humanlike social robots dem-
onstrates that the idea of pairing is still an attractive
basis upon which to support communication. Indeed, it
also goes some way to indicate that the concept does
contain a considerable degree of flexibility. While robots
created by Hanson and Ishiguro for example would seem
to stress the importance of sharing a very similar form
with humans, robots such as Kismet are clearly not
designed to look as humanlike as either Ishiguro’s dou-
ble or Hanson’s robot, Jules. The machinelike aspects
of the appearance of Kismet mean that it cannot easily
be categorised as white or indeed as male or female [53].
In spite of this, its cartoon-like face and ability to read
people’s behaviour and to behave in humanlike ways
allows it to provide an easily recognisable level of hu-
manness. In addition, although animal-like robots are
designed primarily to promote a zoomorphic as opposed
to an anthropomorphic response, they are still likely
to be anthropomorphised by people with whom they
come into contact, since such responses are also elicited
in respect to animals, in particular household pets. Of
course, this level of anthropomorphic response, whether
to an animal or an animal-like machine, is exactly that
which scientific, and scholarly discourse more generally,
regards as “intellectually unsound” [29][5][21]. However,
as I argue below, retaining a level of acceptance for the
utility of such anthropomorphic responses may be an
essential part of enabling effective human-robot inter-
actions and teamwork.
4 Familiarity in communication
In broad terms, Husserl’s phenomenological appraisal
of the importance of commonality, both in form and
behaviour, can be understood to act as “the very foun-
dation of modern theories of communication” [11]. The
assumption that humanlike robots are likely to make
more effective social robots can therefore also be un-
derstood as based on particular understandings of com-
munication that value commonality over difference. The
suggestions of science fiction writers such as Asimov, as
well as the design paths followed in real life—whether
the realistic pathway of Hanson, for example, or the
caricature illustrated by Breazeal’s Kismet—are driven
by the desire to make robots that are familiar because
they can communicate in a “natural” manner [6][7][45].
In particular, humanlike robots are designed to commu-
nicate using humanlike channels, including voice, facial
expressions and bodily gestures and movements.
On some occasions the goal for humanlike robots
is to communicate accurate or helpful information di-
rectly to people. This applies, for example when ASIMO
is positioned as a museum guide. Understanding the
communication of a robot in these terms falls within
the cybernetic tradition of theory, for which commu-
nication is linked with the clear transmission or ex-
change of accurate information [13]. However, a robot’s
communication will also often be framed in terms of
a particular social situation. For example, positioning
ASIMO as a museum guide reinforces the idea that the
robot is an information provider, and also places further
importance on the clarity and accuracy of its communi-
cation. In this case, ASIMO is required to comply with
the social and cultural expectations that visitors feel
are appropriate for a guide, a perspective on communi-
cation that falls within the sociocultural tradition. This
tradition positions communication as a means of pro-
ducing, and reproducing a shared understanding of the
world [13][9].
Other robots are positioned very differently, and this
has an important impact on their appearance and be-
haviour. For example, Kismet’s cute expressive face,
clear responses to praise or scolding and pre-linguistic
babbling speech were chosen specifically to position this
robot as an infant strongly enough to convey this un-
derstanding to people visiting the robot in its labora-
tory setting. People interacting with Kismet were there-
fore placed as caregivers, causing them to exaggerate
their tones of voice when communicating with Kismet
as they would do with a small child. This helped the
robot to respond to people’s tones of voice in the ex-
pected way, thus further supporting the child-caregiver
frame for these interactions [7]. There was also a socio-
psychological element to Kismet’s infant-like chatter
which, when taken alongside its wide-eyed face, also
highlights the persuasive influence that was part of its
communication style [13]. Kismet drew people in by
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craning its head and neck towards them, engaging them
with its stylised expressions and baby-like babbles.
The theories of communication employed above—
cybernetic, sociocultural and sociopsychological—often
work in parallel to position humanlike social robots,
and their human communication partners, in ways that
reinforce the idea of the robot as like another human. It
is clear that such perspectives on communication value
the idea of emphasising commonality with humans, as
opposed to highlighting the differences that a robot, as
machine and not human, might possess.
5 Critiquing ideas of commonality
The relations between humans and humanlike and/or
animal-like robots would seem to be potentially very
different from human relations with technologies such
as computers, described by Turkle as “evocative ob-
jects” in The Second Self [52]. Instead, Turkle argues
that humanlike robots such as Kismet are better thought
of as “relational artifacts”, because they do not “in-
vite projection” as is the case for evocative objects; in-
stead, relational artifacts “demand engagement”, with
humanlike robots demanding that people relate to them
as they would to another human [52][53]. Designing
robots with humanlike and animal-like form and be-
haviour is therefore less about evoking a wide range of
interpretations and responses, and more about facilitat-
ing one clear understanding and mode of interaction for
each robot. The careful framing of robots as humalike
has been discussed above, in relation to ASIMO, as well
as the creations of Hanson, Ishiguro and Breazeal. The
statements of Hanson and Breazeal clarify that they
aim to reduce uncertainty in the interaction and the
misunderstanding it might cause by designing robots
with familiar forms and behaviours [7][28][45]. In par-
ticular, the intention is to make interactions with the
robot easier and more meaningful for more people. This
might well make sense for robots designed as social com-
panions over the short term; however, leaving a robot’s
form and behaviour open to interpretation may offer
increased opportunities for long-term relations to de-
velop, simply because communication with such a ma-
chine is likely to be varied and might even be more
intriguing over a longer period of time.
Another problem with adopting humanlike form and
behaviour to shape human-robot interactions is the lim-
itations that this introduces into the robot’s overall de-
sign. It is difficult to create an anthropomorphous robot
that is also able to use novel ways with which to sense
its surroundings and to communicate; instead, such a
robot is in effect limited to being like a human. From
an anthropocentric perspective that views humans as
the pinnacle of the evolutionary process this might be
acceptable, since from this point of view being human-
like could also also be the pinnacle for robots. Indeed,
the development of humanlike robots is regarded by
some researchers as “the Grail” of robotics [39]. How-
ever, adopting this viewpoint overlooks both the diffi-
culties of creating robots in humanlike form, and also
the possibilities of creating robots that have very dif-
ferent ways from humans to view, and communicate
about, the world.
From a practical point of view, regarding common-
ality as of prime importance means that one is less likely
to meet and have the opportunity to respond openly to
an other’s opinions, ideas, perceptions and understand-
ings of the world or particular situations at hand. This
perspective is of particular importance for robotics, be-
cause the formation of human-robot working partner-
ships or teams has the potential to combine radically
different human and non-human perceptual and motor
skills and abilities to form a more flexible team than a
human team. However, a focus on building robots that
are as humanlike as possible is likely to reduce the po-
tential for combining radically different abilities in a
human-robot team.
While not much talked about in social robotics, the
tendency to value what communicators have in common
over and above the different perspectives they might of-
fer, has received considerable attention from communi-
cations scholars. In particular, John Durham Peters and
Amit Pinchevski have critiqued communication theory
that frames communication as a process of overcom-
ing or eliminating difference, arguing that this idea is
‘violent’ to the other [41][42]. In making their argu-
ments Peters and Pinckevski both draw upon the phe-
nomenological tradition of communication theory that
has its origins in the work of philosophers such as Lev-
inas, who critiqued and extended Husserl’s ideas. Fun-
damental to the phenomenological tradition, as devel-
oped by Levinas, is the idea that the other always re-
tains a level of alterity and therefore cannot be com-
pletely comprehended by the self. From a Levinasian
perspective, framing communication in terms of pair-
ing and commonality, which are inherently reliant on
the idea of understanding the other in terms of the self,
results in the “reduplication of the self” (to use Peters’
phrase) and the “elimination of difference” (the conclu-
sion of Pinchevski) [41][42]. In terms of communication
between humans, this violence is undesirable, because
it can be linked with a disrespect for others, and their
personal, cultural and social differences from the self.
In contrast, Levinas suggests that while self and
other must come into proximity for communication to
occur, the distance, and the related difference, that re-
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mains between them is the reason that communica-
tion occurs at all [37]. Levinas himself was concerned
with exploring the ethics of human-human interactions,
excluding animals and objects from his consideration
as part of that focus[34][35]. However, as Christopher
Diehm notes, aside from Levinas’ insistence that only
humans can take part in this type of ethical encounter,
his philsophy in itself “does not require of the ethical
relation an other who can reciprocate” [18]. Indeed, a
number of scholars have argued that animals can take
part in Levinasian encounters with humans [17][12], and
David Gunkel has also considered the question of the
moral agency of machines in light of Levinas’ philoso-
phy [27]. This paper sets asides the question of ethics
in Levinas’ self-other encounter to focus instead on the
communicative potential it invokes. From this perspec-
tive the key elements are the self’s decision to respond
to the “call” of the other, alongside a decision to respect
the presence of the other’s absolute alterity from the
self. As Levinas clarifies, the other need not communi-
cate using language, but might express themselves using
“the whole body” or “a hand or curve of the shoulder”
[37]. It is therefore possible to consider the potential for
human encounters with many different forms of robot
by purposely extending Levinas’ perspective on com-
munication to include non-human others.
For social robotics, the critiques of commonality
found in the work of communications scholars reinforce
my suggestion that making robots like humans or an-
imals, may reduce the possibilities of extending peo-
ple’s social relations by introducing them to new forms
of robot that see and interpret the world differently
from them. While encounters between humans and so-
cial robots, both humanlike and animal-like, attract and
hold the attention of people during interactions, it is
machinelike robots, such as those discussed below, that
bring absolute alterity in form and communicative style
into human-robot interactions. Extending Levinas’ con-
ception of communication to human-robot interactions
emphasises the importance of the human’s response to
the robot, together with a constant acknowledgment of
and respect for its difference. An analysis of the rela-
tions that build up between human team members and
EOD robots supports this understanding of communi-
cation between humans and robots. These robots are
certainly not designed to look like humans or animals,
and yet they are accepted as valuable team members,
with non-human characteristics that may be key to the
operation of the team as a whole.
6 Social connections between humans and
machinelike robots in working teams
Humans and machinelike robots work very closely to-
gether in EOD situations, with robots being deployed
alongside humans in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan
in recent years. Although the machines with which sol-
diers work are able to do certain tasks autonomously,
such as righting themselves and retracing their steps
when they lose radio contact with the team, they are
generally under the constant control of a human opera-
tor. They are most often directed via radio signals using
controllers very similar to those used to play computer
games. EOD robots, such as PackBots and Talons, are
not humanlike or animal-like, are not currently autono-
mous and do not have distinctive complex behaviours
supported by artificial intelligence capabilities. They
might therefore be expected to raise few critical issues
relating to human-robot interaction, since communica-
tion with these machines relies on the direct transmis-
sion of information through radio signals, which have
no emotional content and are not open to interpreta-
tion. Indeed, the fact that these machines are broadly
not autonomous precludes them from being discussed
as social robots according to some definitions [15]. In
addition, the form of these machinelike robots clearly
does not support an easy process of ‘pairing’, and their
human-controlled movements would seem to offer lit-
tle opportunity to reveal any level of ‘harmonious be-
haviour’ [31][11]. In spite of this, there is an increasing
amount of evidence that EOD robots are thought of as
team members, and are valued as brave and courageous
in the line of duty [25][1][24][54][50]. It seems that peo-
ple working with EOD robots, even though the robots
are machinelike and under the control of a human, an-
thropomorphise and/or zoomorphise them, interpret-
ing them as having individual personalities and abilities
[24][54][50].
Clues to how such robots can become part of a close-
knit team with humans, in spite of their lack of auton-
omy and seeming deficit of social and emotional expres-
sion, can be found in interviews with army personnel.
It is clear that many EOD robots are assigned names
and genders, Sgt. Talon for example being male, as was
a robot called Frankenstein [25][50]. These robots are
assigned status as individuals, in spite of the fact that
there are only a certain number of makes and models of
robot in use at any one time. This may be because, al-
though radio controlled, the robots do reveal individual
quirks and may make strange unexpected moves [25].
These individual differences are, of course, not an in-
tentional part of the robot’s design. They are not built
in with programming nor do they emerge as learned re-
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sponses; instead, they are a consequence of the physical
state of the machine and the environment in which it is
working. Some of their actions may be related to soft-
ware or hardware malfunctions, some to the extremes
of environment in which they work and others to dif-
ficulties with maintaining clear radio contact. Finding
the source of the robot’s actions might seem important,
since software and hardware glitches could be repaired,
if identified. In practice, however, it seems that many
small behavioural quirks remain over time, and it is the
way that these individual behaviours are interpreted by
operators and other soldiers that becomes important in
assigning a personality to each robot.
EOD robots are read as expressive and communica-
tive by their operators and other soldiers in ways that
can be described in terms of what Erving Goffman calls
“small behaviors” [26]. Goffman identifies these as “the
glances, gestures, positionings, and verbal statements
that people continually feed into the situation, whether
intended or not” [26]. While EOD robots do not make
verbal statements, their unintentional behaviours are
read by human observers as “external signs of orienta-
tion and involvement”[26]. In terms of the communi-
cation theory I have already discussed, changes in the
gaze direction of their camera, gestures of their arm
and whole body movements of EOD robots are read as
acts of non-verbal communication. For example, Sgt.
Talon had a reputation as a reliable robot, and con-
tinued working even after “a couple of detonations in
front of his face” [25]. The one occasion on which this
robot broke down, the replacement that was sent in
was destroyed, leading one of the EOD personnel to
suggest that Sgt. Talon “shut down because he knew
something bad would happen” [25]. It is difficult to con-
sider these somewhat random and unplanned signals
as precise transmissions of information. These robots
only ‘communicate’ information directly through their
responses to radio signalled instructions, and the read-
ings provided by their sensors and the images captured
through their cameras are also passed directly to their
operators for interpretation. In spite of this, the un-
planned and uncontrolled behaviours they reveal do
seem to be read as persuasive communications, given
the reactions they invoke in their human teammates.
It is particularly important to consider the effect
of the socio-cultural positioning of EOD robots as life-
savers, sent into dangerous situations in lieu of a hu-
man soldier. As such, each time these robots complete
a controlled explosion, defuse a bomb, or provide vital
surveillance footage, their value rises and the bond felt
with the robot will increase, alongside a sense of respect
for and trust in the machine’s abilities. EOD robots are
not designed to be like humans or animals, but the re-
lationship between operator and robot has nevertheless
been compared with various kinds of human-dog rela-
tions, including with pets, hunting dogs and also work-
ing police dogs [46][50]. Ian Roderick argues, based on
his detailed analysis of news reports and US Depart-
ment of Defense press releases, that peoples’ readings
of non-autonomous EOD robots as agents stem from
the social value that results from their positioning as
saving people from injury or death, as opposed to from
a mistaken impression that they are autonomous based
on what he describes as a “proto-anthropological” pro-
cess [46]. However, I would argue that the words that
soldiers use to describe their robots demonstrate a level
of anthropomorphism and/or zoomorphism, alongside a
sense of valuing the robot for the danger it faces to keep
humans safe. It is also worth noting that there is evi-
dence that the foibles of some EOD robots leave human
members of the team less well disposed towards them.
Although these stories have not formed the basis of any
news reports or research (to my knowledge) they are
discussed in associated Reddit comment threads [51].
Staff engaged in repairing damaged robots may com-
ment that a robot “came in missing half an arm ... but
it’s starting to look alive again”, but they have a prag-
matic response to the need to replace robots that have
been damaged beyond repair [43][25]. However, soldiers
deployed with robots on missions not only rely on the
robot to save lives, but also interact with a particu-
lar robot closely over an extended period of time. Sol-
diers bringing in damaged robots for repair do not want
to be given a new robot, they want the old one to be
fixed, with one soldier giving a clear reason: “That lit-
tle guy saved our butts on many occasions” [43][50].
For repair technicians, robots are understood as valu-
able team members that may even be “alive”, but they
are also machines that can be replaced, whereas, for
the soldiers with which the robots are deployed, it is
the individual machine that is meaningful [43]. It is the
particular machine that is respected and trusted as a
team member. In part, as Roderick suggest, this is likely
to be because of the situation in which robot and hu-
man are embedded, placing the robot as a lifesaver [46].
However, an anthropomorphic response is also a pres-
ence, as one soldier stresses while discussing a robot
named Frankenstein, “He was part of our team, one of
us. He did feel like family” [25][50].
Although it may be difficult to understand these
responses to robots when not involved in such situa-
tions in real life, the differences between soldiers’ and
engineers’ appraisals of the importance of individual
robots are mirrored in popular fiction when Luke Sky-
walker is offered a new R2 unit in replacement for his,
which “seems a little beat up”. Luke refuses, explain-
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ing: “Not on your life! That little droid and I have been
through a lot together” before he turns to R2-D2 to ask
“You okay, R2?” [38]. The parallel between responses to
R2-D2 and EOD robots is clear; although, in contrast
to EOD robots, R2-D2 is portrayed as an intelligent,
autonomous machine, which might more easily be ex-
pected to elicit such loyalty from his human compan-
ion. However, in spite of their current lack of auton-
omy, EOD robots are able to bring non-human skills
into the team by virtue of their size and maneuver-
ability in constrained spaces, as well as the facility to
add sensors that enable them to sense their surround-
ings based on heat signatures or chemical detection. As
humans learn to work with particular robots, operat-
ing together over time as a team that completes joint
tasks, a relation develops that increases the fluency of
the team. The human operator becomes attuned to a
few particular robots and is therefore better able to
control those robots precisely given their individual be-
havioural quirks.
The examples above, relating to EOD robots, sug-
gest that relations between humans and these robots
develop in part because they are deployed into danger-
ous situations, in which the effect of positioning the
robot as a lifesaver has a not inconsiderable influence.
However, this type of response, where people begin to
respect and trust a robot, has also been shown in ex-
periments taking place in the safety of a laboratory
with AUR, a robotic desk lamp created by Guy Hoff-
man at MIT. Unlike present day EOD robots, AUR is
autonomous and acts on its sense of a human’s vocal,
hand, head and body movements, as well as its un-
derstanding of the joint task. A consideration of AUR
therefore raises questions relating to how best to work
with EOD robots, assuming that in the future these
robots will be more autonomous in their operation as
well as continuing to be positioned as saving lives.
7 Experiments in working with a robot
Hoffman designed and built AUR to take part in a se-
ries of experiments with human participants, where hu-
man and robot collaborated to complete a simple task.
The experimental setup included three lecterns, the aim
being for the human to direct the robot to turn to-
wards a particular lectern and then change its lamp
colour according to a written instruction hidden be-
neath one of a set of flaps on the lectern’s surface. AUR
was able to interpret simple voice commands, such as
“come here”, and could track the human’s hand, head
and whole body movements [30]. In this team, the hu-
man is valued for their overall comprehension of the
task and the ability to pass instructions from the list
they have been given to the robot, while AUR provides
its non-human ability to cast coloured light alongside
its responsiveness to movement and voice commands.
The robot operated in two different ways. In the first,
reactive mode, AUR simply followed the instructions
and movements of the human; in the second, fluency
mode, the robot learned the task at the same time as
the human, and where possible began to anticipate the
commands it was about to be given. AUR was devel-
oped to investigate ways of making human-robot in-
teractions more fluent, as opposed to following strict
turn-taking rules. Hoffman identifies anticipation, both
about the surrounding environment and the actions of
one’s partner, as key in supporting successful human-
robot collaboration, something that is also identified,
by Anthony Finn and Steve Scheding, as important for
unmanned vehicle systems [30][20]. Indeed, it seems rea-
sonable to suggest that being able to anticipate both en-
vironmental situations and people’s instructions might
well be of importance for all social robots. In addition,
Hoffman suggests that a process of “repetition, practice
and rehearsal” is also a valuable support in improving
the effectiveness of any collaborative partnership [30].
In reactive mode, people learnt to operate the robot,
via movement, gesture and vocal commands and the
robot simply does as instructed. The repetitious na-
ture of the task therefore helped the human partici-
pant become adept at directing the robot accurately,
but anticipation on the part of AUR did not come into
play. In spite of this, people were still impressed by
the lamp’s ability to follow instructions. After working
with the lamp over the course of the experiment, one
participant noted that there were times when they felt
as if they were “interacting with a being that was more
alive... [than a] machine” [30]. This response is similar
to that of EOD personnel and also repair technicians,
who, even though they know the robot is under direct
human control, nevertheless describe it as being “alive”
[43]. AUR’s intentions and attitudes were read by hu-
man participants based on the position of its support-
ing neck, lampshade head and light beam gaze [30]. In
spite of the lamp’s machinelike form (showing a close re-
semblance to a common household object), this robot
was nonetheless read as somewhat humanlike and/or
animal-like by participants. As was the case for EOD
robots, its “small behaviors” place it as a social subject
[26]. However, in reactive mode, communication with
AUR is best assessed as a cybernetic process of infor-
mation transfer, through which the human directs the
robot, and the robot’s response is implicitly communi-
cated by its completion of the requested movement or
change in lamp colour. The way in which the robot fol-
lowed a command and then waited for the next instruc-
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tion made working with AUR in this mode very similar
to the process of operating an EOD robot, although in-
stead of a game-controller which might emphasise the
nature of the relation, with AUR the free use of voice
and gestures to command the robot may obscure the
direct command structure.
The persuasive effect of AUR’s behaviour, and the
idea of the robot as a socially aware being and team-
member, was much more marked in fluency mode. In
this mode, the sequence of required moves and colours
was learnt by both human and robot. The lamp was
programmed to pay attention both to the human’s in-
structions and to what it had learnt about the task for
itself. This meant that the lamp gradually anticipated
the human’s movements and requests, fewer voice com-
mands were required, and the team moved faster from
one lectern to the next as the experiment progressed.
In this mode, the sense that AUR was as committed
to completing the task as the human was particularly
well-communicated. Human and robot were working to-
gether in a way that set aside turn-taking, in favour of
a more dynamic understanding in which they were part
of a system of overlapping communicative acts of move-
ment, together with occasional vocalisations and lamp
colour changes. The importance of considering human
and robot as communicating and working together as a
system is also noted by those working with EOD teams:
“We preach to everybody, you have to look at the sys-
tem. Not just the machine, but the human” [25].
Hoffman designed AUR to look as much like a nor-
mal desk lamp as possible, seeking to avoid any anthro-
pomorphic or zoomorphic interpretations. However, the
comments of one participant clarify that they did an-
thropomorphise AUR, becoming “good friends” with
the robot, such that they “high-fived mentally after the
task was done” [30]. In contrast, another participant
perceived AUR not “as human but ... possibly an an-
imal” [30]. These examples, therefore, further support
the contention that the human tendency to understand
the unfamiliar by comparison with other more famil-
iar things is unavoidable. In the case of AUR, as soon
as it became clear that it was not an everyday lamp,
people moved on to interpret it as somewhat human-
like or animal-like. Importantly, even as they did this
AUR’s difference from humans and animals remained
obvious by virtue of its form and the robot’s specific
abilities. The same is true of EOD robots, and as such
people’s responses to these robots might be described
as tempered anthropomorphism and/or zoomorphism.
8 Tempered anthropomorphism and/or
zoomorphism
As I have already noted, processes of anthropomor-
phism and zoomorphism would seem flexible enough
to cope with the presence of considerable difference, as
opposed to relying on a close level of ‘pairing’ and ‘har-
monious behavior’ [31][11]. Indeed, it seems that human
understandings of robots, even those not designed to
seem at all humanlike or animal-like, inevitably draw on
anthropomorphic and/or zoomorphic responses. This is
demonstrated by the examples I have discussed above,
as well as in the way that people respond to robotic art
installations [48]. Indeed, people may also read non-
humanoid robots in terms of something about which
they have read, such as an alien in science fiction as
noted in the video relating to the installation of Au-
tonomous Light Air Vessels (version 1.0), blimp-like
robots that are exhibited in flocks [2]. It is reasonable to
suggest that this type of response is unavoidable, being
a pragmatic way for humans to understand anything
that seems to be somewhat alive, by reading it as a lit-
tle like another entity with which they have interacted
before.
Rather than being a problem, a dangerous misread-
ing of reality, such responses to robots are valuable,
in particular where roboticists do not try to reinforce
anthropomorphic and zoomorphic responses. For exam-
ple, the designs of AUR and the various EOD robots
demonstrate how successful human-robot interactions
can be if one accepts the utility of such responses, along-
side the way that they are tempered by a parallel clar-
ity of understanding the robot as a machine. This type
of tempering is also seen in our relations with other
technologies such as cars and computers, which peo-
ple may name and talk to as if they are human on
some occasions, but which they also understand as ma-
chines that can be switched off, discarded, sold or recy-
cled. This tempering, as the examples relating to EOD
robots indicate, may be more challenging in the case
of robots than cars or computers for a variety of rea-
sons. As noted above, humans perceive EOD robots as
individuals, value the non-human skills they bring to
the team and are also working with them in danger-
ous situations which position the robot as a potential
life saver. It may therefore be unsurprising that sol-
diers find it difficult to part with their robot, even if
it is damaged beyond repair. However, it is also clear
that soldiers are nonetheless able to send EOD robots
into dangerous situations, in the same way that other
circumstances may call for dogs and/or humans to be
deployed. The relationship between humans and EOD
robots is therefore a delicate balance between fostering
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a sense that the robot as an individual is important to
the team, and the understanding that its ‘life’ is ex-
pendible in the context of the military setting in which
it is being put to use.
The most important aspect of tempered anthrop-
morphism and/or zoomorphism is the way that it al-
lows a robot to be considered familiar enough in its be-
haviour to interpret its movements as meaningful, while
also leaving space to acknowledge its fundamental dif-
ferences from both humans and animals. Although, as
the early sections of this paper emphasised, roboticists
who create social robots more often than not choose to
reinforce an anthropomorphic or zoomorphic response,
the more recent discussions of AUR and EOD robots
demonstrate how not following this path can result in
the development of flexible and resilient mid to long
term relations between humans and machinelike robots.
These relations are best understood to rely upon human
understandings of the robot as somewhat humanlike or
animal-like, but where these responses are continually
temperered by also perceiving the robot as a machine.
The machinelike nature of these robots is important be-
cause it offers the potential for them to share abilities
that are very different from humans and animals when
working in teams with humans. As I noted in the case
of AUR, fluid communication between humans and ma-
chinelike robots may take some time to achieve, but the
gradual development of the relation also allows time for
the human to gain a sense of confidence in the abilities
that the robot brings to the team. As David Bruemmer,
cited by P. W. Singer, suggests, this level of confidence
is a key part of enabling humans to develop a level of
trust in the robots with which they work [50].
9 Trust and respect in working teams
The development of a working relation with robots such
as EOD robots and AUR over time alters the way in
which humans see the machine, from regarding it as
an object, or a tool, to interpreting it as an intelligent
member of the team. While this may seem reasonable
in the case of AUR, at least when operating in fluency
mode, it seems less well supported for the broadly radio-
controlled EOD robots. However, as I have shown, EOD
robots are clearly adopted as team-members, both when
on active duty and also during downtime, although the
decision to take one robot fishing may simply indicate
the need for humour when working in dangerous situ-
ations [25]. Most importantly, the relation that builds
between human and robot is strong enough in the case
of AUR, and in the case of EOD robots, for humans to
develop a sense of “respect” for the robot and “trust” in
its abilities [30][25]. Indeed, it is likely that people’s feel-
ings for EOD robots will only increase as their ability
to operate autonomously is developed, even if there is
always a point at which a human retains ultimate con-
trol. Although news reports, in particular those based
on the recent research of Julie Carpenter, indicate a
level of concern over the way in which people’s feelings
for EOD robots might affect their deployment, with the
suggestion that favourite robots might be kept out of
particularly dangerous situations even when best suited
to act, there is no evidence that this occurs at present
[1][24][54][10]. Rather than being worried by people’s
personalised response to a robot, I would argue that
this is valuable in allowing human and robot to work to-
gether fluently as a team. At present, as I indicated ear-
lier, the limited autonomy of EOD robots means that
the increase in fluency is mostly related to the human
becoming attuned to the robot’s particular operating
constraints and abilities. However, in the future, with
increased autonomy, humans may need to be able to
respond to the robot’s own decisions to act based on
its sense of the situation.
The development of feelings of trust and respect
for robots will only become more important as robots
themselves have more to offer in terms of their inter-
pretation of a situation, and understanding of the best
course of action. This is highlighted by considering a
particular moment that occurred during human inter-
actions with AUR. The human participant makes a mis-
take, and directs the lamp towards the wrong lectern.
However, since it has its own understanding of the task,
the lamp does not simply follow the human’s lead, in-
stead it does a ‘double-take’. The lamp first turns the
way it ‘thinks’ it has learnt is correct, and then turns to
‘look’ back at its human teammate. The movement is
very small, but it is noticeable because it interrupts the
flow of the system created as AUR and human move
together through the experiment. The human sees the
lamp’s indecision, pauses and corrects their mistake to
redirect the lamp towards the correct lectern, and then
asks for the required colour [30]. For this response to
occur, the human must build up a level of trust in and
respect for the robot’s point of view, such that they
reassess their instruction and realise it was wrong. Peo-
ple working with AUR in a successful team are required
to understand that the robot might remember how to
complete the task better than they do, and in the fu-
ture the same might be true of people working with
intelligent EOD robots.
From a sociopsychological perspective, the lamp is
able to persuade the human of its intelligence, such that
the person accepts it knows best. Alternatively, taking
a more phenomenological stance, through a process of
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tempered anthropomorphism the human recognises the
robot’s otherness, and judges its value as an individ-
ual with its own knowledge which may be better then
their own. The importance of this momentary interrup-
tion in the flow of communication also emphasises the
need to attend to individual communicators, even as
the system of communication seems more important in
such a dynamic interaction. Although roboticists such
as Hoffman, and Finn and Scheding, are focused on the
value of creating fluid and anticipatory communication
in enabling humans and robots to work effectively to-
gether, the breaks in the system’s flowing progress may
be just as informative as the smooth interchange that
surrounds them. Indeed, recognising those interruptions
as valuable may well be key in enabling humans and
robots to work together to the best of both their abil-
ities, in particular as robots become increasingly au-
tonomous.
10 Conclusion
The first half of this paper critically assessed some of
the assumptions about form, behaviour and communi-
cation that are used to support the development of hu-
manlike and animal-like social robots with the aim of
destabilising the sense in which commonality is seen as
a vital element of such designs. The idea that humans
and machinelike robots can interact in effective and
complex ways was then explored through an analysis of
human relations with EOD robots, as well as human in-
teractions with the robotic desk lamp, AUR. The ways
in which humans talk about these machinelike robots
indicate that the relations developed between human
and robot are social in nature, as well as being directed
towards the completion of particular tasks. Machinelike
robots are perceived by people as communicative and
collaborative as they work with them over time.
Key to the development of strong working human-
robot partnerships and teams is the presence of tem-
pered anthropomorphic and/or zoomorphic responses
in humans in relation to the robot. For machinelike
robots, people’s assessment of their behaviour as ei-
ther somewhat humanlike or somewhat animal-like is
constantly being reappraised in light of the fact that
the robot is clearly a machine. This means that hu-
man interactions with machinelike robots retain a clear
acknowledgement of the otherness of the robot at all
times. This has the potential to allow a robot’s dif-
ferent perceptual and motor skills to become a valu-
able part of a human-robot team or partnership within
which humans and robots are able to work together to
the best of their diverse abilities. Important to these re-
lations is also the way that they develop over a period
of time, during which human and robot work together,
and may also learn together. The value of sharing expe-
riences, even when a robot is not truly autonomous or
able to learn for itself, as is the case with EOD robots,
may be restricted to allowing humans to better oper-
ate a particular robot. However, in the future, if such
robots make decisions about where to move or how to
act based on their own sense of the environment and
the task at hand, humans and robots will be in a more
clearly collaborative relation, within which the human
will need to respond to the robot based on the respect
and trust that they have built up for that robot over
time.
This paper’s analysis of working relations between
humans and machinelike robots as social could be ex-
tended to suggest that such robots have the potential to
enrich people’s lives more generally. Indeed, machine-
like robots might be able to provide additional forms
of social communication, as opposed to being overtly
positioned as direct replacements for the social contact
people might otherwise experience with humans or ani-
mals. Interactions between humans and robots that are
not humanlike or animal-like in form have the potential
to develop over time, leading to the formation of long-
term relations within which the differences between par-
ticipants are seen as an asset, as opposed to a difficulty
that must be overcome.
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